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California presently limits the once unfettered right to discharge an
employee-the employment at will doctrine-by use of three judicially-
created exceptions. None provides the degree of protection commensu-
rate with what should be recognized as a fundamental right to freedom
from arbitrary employment termination decisions. This Note suggests
that Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. I presents the California Supreme
Court with the opportunity to base such protection squarely on the
Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.2
In the two years that Foley has been pending before the California
Supreme Court, hopes have grown that the decision will provide some
definitive signposts leading out of the current morass in wrongful dis-
charge law. The court may choose to construe narrowly the questions
presented in Foley and simply address the scope of an actionable breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But such a limited
approach will only leave a host of questions unanswered about the entire
range of permissible employment termination decisions. California has
uniquely based concerns to be safeguarded here, and they can best be
protected by eliminating the outmoded at will rule completely and re-
placing it with a constitutionally premised alternative.
Part I of this Note details the evolution of the three exceptions to
the at will rule-public policy, the implied-in-fact covenant, and the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. Part II examines the contradictory
holdings of the courts of appeal and the need for a definitive resolution
by the California Supreme Court. Part II then suggests that the patch-
work of existing federal preemption concerns is the chief reason why con-
tinued judicial and legislative tinkering with the common law
employment at will rule may leave California without adequate means to
safeguard its special interests in this area. Finally, Part III establishes
1. 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), rev. granted, 41 Cal. 3d 35, 712 P.2d
891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986). See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
2. "A person may not be... denied equal protection of the laws .... ." CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 7(a).
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that, by virtue of California's Equal Protection Clause, the right to be
discharged only for just cause is a constitutionally protected fundamental
right.
I. The Common Law Evolutionary Process: Implied
Restrictions on the Freedom to Discharge at Will
A. The Traditional Doctrine
The employment at will doctrine grew out of pre-industrial concepts
of master and servant.3 These theories included notions of personalized,
reciprocal duties and obligations.4 By the mid-1 800s, however, the devel-
opment of more sophisticated contract principles led to a broader refor-
mulation of the employment relationship.' This shift in attitude was a
product of the new value placed on the absolute freedom to contract. As
expressed by an influential treatise writer of that era, the employment at
will rule gave the employer the absolute right to discharge an employee
at any time with or without cause.6 The courts reasoned that since an
employee could resign at any time, an employer should be entitled to
discharge an employee with the same ease.
3. The term "master and servant" accurately describes the unequal status inherent in the
employment relationship in the 18th century. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 674 (1960), cited in
Foley, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 246 n.1, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 868 n.1.
4. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824 (1980); Note, A Common Law
Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-39 (1975).
5. The transmutation of the right to discharge one's personal servants into a comparable
right in the factory or farmhouse setting was expressed as follows: "May I not refuse to trade
with any one? May I not forbid my family to trade with any one? May I not dismiss my
domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, when I forbid? And if my domestic, why not my
farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster?" Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416
(1967) (quoting Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 8 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)).
6. "[T]he rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish
it by proof. A hiring .... no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve." Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 601, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886
(1980) (quoting H. WOOD, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877)). Various
commentators have noted that none of the four authorities Wood cited supported his oft-
quoted "rule." See, e.g., Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAW. 1,
4 (1984) ("the employment-at-will doctrine has a shaky foundation").
7. Precisely as may the employee cease labor at his whim or pleasure, and,
whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent, leave no one a legal right to com-
plain; so, upon the other hand, may the employer discharge, and, whatever his reason
be, good, bad, or indifferent, no one has suffered a legal wrong.
Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554, 112 P.2d 886, 888 (1910).
This reasoning assumed that the employee gave no independent consideration beyond render-
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Although the rule was articulated in deceptively egalitarian terms,
the historically unequal bargaining positions of labor and management
during an era of industrial ferment8 clearly affected application of the
rule. The courts' strict use of the rule tended to disfavor labor. In Adair
v. United States,9 for example, a supervisory railroad employee who had
fired a subordinate challenged a federal law criminalizing an interstate
carrier's discharge of an employee for membership in a labor organiza-
tion. The Supreme Court held that the challenged portion of the Rail-
way Labor Act"° was an unconstitutional interference with the parties'
freedom to contract.
The Court in Adair reasoned that fifth amendment liberty and prop-
erty fights included "the right to make contracts for the purchase of the
labor of others... and for the sale of one's own labor.... .""1 Thus, the
Court ruled that Congress lacked the power to "unreasonably interfere"
with individuals' contracts.' 2 The Court could have viewed the law as a
reasonable exercise of the police power;' 3 instead, the Court ruled that
there was no real or substantial relation between labor union membership
and interstate commerce that might justify this criminal penalty provi-
ing services. Courts in this era relied heavily on formalistic rules of contract formation. See
infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
8. Management countered the labor organizing efforts of the post-Civil War era with
fierce resistance. The Chicago Pullman strike of 1894 was a notorious example, and precipi-
tated a formal investigation followed by congressional action in 1898. See infra note 10 and
accompanying text.
9. 208 U.S. 161 (1907).
10. Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (repealed). Section 10 of the Act had
provided:
That any employer... and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer, who
shall require any employee, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of
such employment, to enter into an agreement... not to become or remain a member
of any labor organization ... or shall threaten any employee with loss of employ-
ment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any employee because of his membership
in such a labor association... or who shall, after having discharged an employee,
attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment .. is
hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction ... shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not more
than one thousand dollars.
Id. § 10, 30 Stat. at 428, quoted in Adair, 208 U.S. at 168-69 (emphasis omitted).
11. 208 U.S. at 172.
12. Id. at 174. The Court stated:
It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business
relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is
the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. With his reasons neither the public
nor third persons have any legal concern.
Id. at 173 (quoting T. COOLEY, COOLEY ON ToRTs 278 (1879)).
13. The Act included detailed provisions for arbitration of controversies between inter-
state carriers and their employees that threatened to interrupt the carriers' business. Congress
clearly had drafted the Act to avert incidents of labor unrest such as the 1894 Chicago strike.
Id. at 185 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
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sion under the Commerce Clause. 14
Adair and a related case, Coppage v. Kansas,"5 are two of the more
startling examples of the courts' deference to liberty of contract princi-
ples in the early years of this century. Prevailing contractual theories
provided for only one limitation on the employment at will doctrine: the
"mutuality of obligation" rule. 16 However, the very premise of the mutu-
ality of obligation rule is faulty. As commentators have since noted, the
adequacy of consideration is generally a matter for the contracting par-
ties to determine, and not one into which the courts ordinarily will
inquire. 17
Twenty-two years after Coppage, the United States Supreme Court
changed its views, permitting broader judicial interference in employ-
ment contract relations. 8 In N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,19
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA)z° and ruled that labor relations in industries "affecting
commerce" 21 are a proper subject of congressional action. The Court
emphasized the helplessness of an employee who resists arbitrary and
unfair treatment by an employer, upon whom the employee depends for
"his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family."2 This rejec-
14. Id. at 174-80. The Commerce Clause gives Congress power "[t]o regulate commerce
... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Coppage invalidated state legislation preventing employers from
refusing to hire or discharge employees on the basis of union membership.
16. In the employment context, this rule required that an employee furnish additional
consideration (beyond the mere performance of services) in order to bind an employer to a
promise to discharge only for cause. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal.
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484-85 (1976) ("reinforcing ... [the] basic [at will]
rule is a special rule of mutuality of obligation: if the employee is free to quit at any time, then
the employer must be free to dismiss at any time"). Cf Blades, supra note 5, at 1419-20
("mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement... [but] is simply... an imperfect
way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the
employer's right of discharge-lack of consideration.").
17. Courts refuse to inquire into adequacy once satisfied that the consideration is not so
minimal as to raise doubts that the contract was formed as a result of fraud or undue influence.
But the mutuality of obligation rule has lost its force as a consideration requirement. See
Summers, supra note 16; Blades, supra note 5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79
(1981) (rule has been abrogated).
18. The Court's shift may be traced to the "political, intellectual, and economic pressures
of the 1930's" that led to the demise of the absolute freedom to contract as espoused in Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57-58
(1978). The defendant in Lochner had been convicted of the misdemeanor violation of a New
York statute which prohibited work in factories for more than 60 hours per week or ten hours
per day. The Supreme Court held that the statute was not a valid health and safety measure
and exceeded the state's police power since it impermissibly interfered with an individual's
freedom to enter into such labor contracts as he might deem appropriate. 198 U.S. at 56-58.
19. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1986).
21. 301 U.S. at 6.
22. Id. at 33.
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tion of the laissez-faire attitudes of Adair and Coppage23 marked the be-
ginning of a trend which has led many modem courts to curtail the
employment at will rule.24 However, the rule has persisted unchanged in
a minority of jurisdictions.25
California has codified the employment at will rule in its Labor
Code section 2922.26 The courts have interpreted the rule as a presump-
tion rebuttable by evidence that the employment contract bound the par-
ties to a specified term.27 Until 1980, California courts recognized only
two limitations on the employment at will rule: an aggrieved employee
had to show (1) that his termination violated some public policy or stat-
ute;28 or (2) that the terms of his contract expressly or impliedly provided
for termination only for good cause.29 Judicial evolution of the first of
these two restrictions led to a frontal attack on the at will rule itself.
B. The Public Policy Exception
California initially recognized that various carefully delineated pub-
lic policies (for example, permitting the filing of workers' compensation
23. Declining to overrule Adair and Coppage explicitly, the Court in Jones & Laughlin
stated that those cases were "inapplicable to legislation" such as the NLRA, which, in the
Court's view, did not interfere with the "normal exercise" of the employment at will rule. Id.
at 45. Rather, the NLRA prohibited the use of the rule to "intimidate or coerce... employees
with respect to their self-organization." Id. at 45-46.
24. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (recogniz-
ing public policy exception to at will rule); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652
P.2d 625 (1982) (same).
25. Rose v. Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Advance Reports 29, 719 P.2d 83 (1986) (at
will rule continues absent special consideration or express stipulation as to the duration of
employment); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978)
(same).
26. Section 2922 provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may be termi-
nated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means
an employment for a period greater than one month." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1986).
27. Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosps., 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605,
611 (1984).
28. Petermann v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959), exemplifies this limitation. In Petermann, the court held that plaintiff stated a cause of
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, based on allegations that he was
terminated for refusing to obey his employer's order to perjure himself when testifying before a
state legislative committee.
The court emphasized the nefariousness of the employer's conduct and the existence of a
statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1970), proscribing perjury. It concluded that an em-
ployer's authority to discharge an at will employee could be limited by statute "or by consider-
ations of public policy." 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. To permit an employer to
condition continuing employment upon the commission of a felony "would be to encourage
criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and serve to contaminate
the honest administration of public affairs." .d. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
29. Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225
(1976). A good cause limitation also would be found where the contract was supported by
independent consideration. Id.
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claims30 and encouraging the associational freedoms of union member-
ship31) properly limit the traditionally unfettered freedom of an employer
to discharge an employee at will.32 It took a number of years for the
courts to develop a broader public policy rationale for such a limitation,
however.
The first significant case in the development of California wrongful
discharge law was Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 33 Gordon Tameny, a
retail sales representative for Arco, alleged he was fired for refusing to
insist that service station dealers in his territory cut their prices to a level
designated by Arco. He alleged that Arco's conduct violated the anti-
trust laws, and appealed the trial court's dismissal of his tortious breach
of contract claim. The California Supreme Court held that Tameny had
stated a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of the
public policy34 against price-fixing. The court explained that a discharge
may contravene public policy without violating a specific statute.
Arco had argued that breach of an employment contract could not
give rise to tort damages. Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner dis-
agreed: "[A] wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual rela-
tionship may afford both tort and contractual relief, and in such
circumstances the existence of the contractual relationship will not bar
the injured party from pursuing redress in tort. ' 3  To underscore the
state's interest in discouraging violations of public policy, the court held
that compensatory and even punitive damages are available to redress
tortious discharges in violation of public policy.
36
Tameny paved the way for the development of two additional theo-
ries which limit the employment at will doctrine: the implied-in-fact cov-
enant and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While the
California courts continue to struggle with the ramifications of these two
30. Portillo v. G. T. Price Products, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1982). However, federal law may preempt claims of disability or physical injury in workers'
compensation proceedings. See infra notes 102-135 and accompanying text.
31. See Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1961).
32. Until 1980, it was not clear whether a public policy without any statutory basis might
support a wrongful discharge claim. At least one pre-Tameny case stated that it could not.
Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960). See also Tyco Indus., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. 540, 547 (1985) (more than "mere
allegation of public policy violation of a statute" is required).
33. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
34. "Public policy" refers to "that principle of law which holds that no citizen can law-
fully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."
Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 65, 72 n.33 (1982) (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
35. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
36. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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theories a7 courts find the public policy concept relatively straightfor-
ward."8 One commentator has suggested that the public policy exception
presents fewer evidentiary problems than the other exceptions to the em-
ployment at will rule.39 The specific event alleged to be an "offense to
public policy" is a relatively simple question of fact compared to the bad
faith motives involved in implied covenants or the often-disputed oral
provisions of an implied-in-fact covenant. 4
C. The Implied-In-Fact Covenant
While the public policy exception is grounded in tort,41 a second
exception, the implied-in-fact covenant, is based on contract. The basis
of the implied-in-fact covenant is an agreement to terminate only for
cause. This exception was developed in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.4 2
The plaintiff in Pugh had been employed for thirty-two years by See's
Candies, and had risen from an entry level position as a dishwasher to
become vice president of production. He was then terminated without
explanation or notice.43
The court of appeal held that the evidence did not support a claim
for tort damages based on the Tameny public policy exception.' How-
37. See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
38. For example, in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985), the Ninth Circuit held that the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act did not preempt plaintiff's claim that he was fired for reporting to local health au-
thorities that the milk shipment he was delivering was spoiled, and that plaintiff stated a cause
of action under Tameny. In Garibaldi, defendant had argued that under the collective bargain-
ing agreement, plaintiff's resort to the arbitration process to challenge his termination consti-
tuted his exclusive recourse. The court disagreed, stating:
A claim grounded in state law for wrongful termination for public policy rea-
sons poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process; it does not alter
the economic relationship between the employer and employee. The remedy is in
tort, distinct from any contractual remedy an employee might have under the collec-
tive bargaining contract. It furthers the state's interest in protecting the general pub-
lic-an interest which transcends the employment relationship.
Id. at 1375 (emphasis in original).
Cf. Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984), in which the
Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1986),
preempted the claim of a miner discharged for complaining about unsafe conditions. See infra
notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
39. Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881, 886
(1983).
40. Id.
41. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
42. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
43. Id. at 316-17, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19. When the plaintiff asked the reason for his
termination, "he was told only that he should 'look deep within [him]self' to find the answer."
Id. at 316, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
44. Pugh alleged that his discharge was at the behest of the company's union employees,
after he had made statements to company negotiators regarding his suspicions of a "sweetheart
contract." A "sweetheart contract" is a collusion between a union and an employer "whereby
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ever, the court found the evidence sufficient to rebut Labor Code section
2922's presumption of employment at will.4 5 Writing for the court, Jus-
tice Grodin characterized the employment at will rule and its codifica-
tion as a product of outdated nineteenth century judicial concerns.4 6 He
recounted the rise of organized labor in response to the "recognized ine-
quality in bargaining power between employer and individual em-
ployee"'47 and the enactment of early limitations on the freedom to
discharge at will.48 The court avoided the "mutuality of obligation"
rule49 by stating that the
"rule [which requires independent consideration] is a rule of con-
struction, not of substance, and... a contract for permanent em-
ployment, whether or not it is based upon some consideration
other than the employee's services, cannot be terminated at the will
of the employer if it contains an express or implied condition to the
contrary."'
Pugh outlined factors which demonstrate a prima facie case of
wrongful termination based on an implied covenant: the length of em-
ployment, commendations and promotions received, lack of criticism of
plaintiff's work, assurances of job security, and defendant's acknowl-
edged personnel policies.51 All of these factors fall within the purview of
a traditional breach of contract action. Moreover, evidence of an express
or implied condition in an unwritten contract such as the typical employ-
one employer would get an unfair competitive advantage over a competitor by getting a lower
wage rate." Id. at 319, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Pugh testified that the company president had
told him his future would be secure if he did good work, and that he had never received any
formal or written criticisms. Pugh also presented evidence that See's Candies had a decades-
long practice of not terminating administrative personnel except for cause.
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
46. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21. It is important to note that
CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922 (West 1986) was derived from CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1999 (1872).
The California Supreme Court has described the 1872 Code as a restatement of existing com-
mon law principles, and stated that the Code was never meant "to insulate the matters therein
expressed from further judicial development." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 814, 532
P.2d. 1226, 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865 (1975) (adopting a comparative negligence rule).
California takes the position that "[i]f the courts have created a bad rule or an outmoded one,
the courts can change it." County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees'
Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 584, 699 P.2d. 835, 848, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 437 (1985).
47. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
48. Id. at 320-21, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (quoting Drzewiecki v. H & R Block,
Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 754, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972)).
51. The defendant would have the burden of producing evidence to show an acceptable
reason for plaintiff's discharge, which the latter could attack as pretextual. If defendant met
this burden, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant's evidence was pretext, defend-
ant would prevail. Id. at 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The allocation of the burden of proof
in Pugh resembles the Burdine-McDonnell Douglas standard for Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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ment relationship is generally admissible to show the terms of the unwrit-
ten contract.52 Pugh thus offers the possibility of traditional contract
relief in some cases where a plaintiff fails to meet the Tameny require-
ments for the more expansive tort remedies.
However, even Pugh leaves some wrongfully discharged plaintiffs
without a remedy. Later cases have held that the existence of a written
contract may bar admission of evidence to show an implied in fact cove-
nant,53 and that even an implied-in-fact promise to terminate only for
cause is not breached by termination of an employee for a legitimate
business reason. 4 Moreover, the existence of an implied-in-fact covenant
is a question for the trier of fact, whose finding is rarely disturbed on
appeal. 5 For these reasons, the search continues for a more flexible the-
ory which will further curtail the employment at will rule.
5 6
D. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. 57 first set out the requirements for
an action based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5"
After 18 years of employment, American Airlines suspended and then
terminated Cleary, allegedly for violating various work regulations.59
The Second District Court of Appeal held that Cleary had stated a
cause of action for breach of an implied-in-law covenant. 60 Justice Jeffer-
son, writing for the court, explained:
52. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
53. Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (plaintiff was employed
less than two years and had a poor work record; written contract in effect at time of termina-
tion superseded any prior implied contractual agreement).
54. Clutterham v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1223, 215 Cal. Rptr. 795
(1985) (defendant's relocation of operations due to depressed industry conditions constituted
"good cause" termination of plaintiff's employment).
55. See Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 185
Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
56. A recent court of appeal decision has suggested that the chief reason this implied-in-
fact covenant is less popular with plaintiffs is that recovery under this theory is considerably
more limited than under the other exceptions to the employment at will rule. Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1166-67, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (1986).
57. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) explains: "Every contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment." Good faith and fair dealing "requires each contracting party to refrain from doing
anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d. 141, 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695
(1979).
59. Cleary charged that these reasons were pretextual and that he had actually been ter-
minated for his union organizing activities. The trial court dismissed all of his causes of action
at the pleadings stage. Ill Cal. App. 3d at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
60. The court also held that plaintiff's cause of action alleging discharge for his union
activities stated a public policy claim within the meaning of Tameny. Id. at 455, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 729.
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There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement....
The duty which arises... is unconditional and independent in na-
ture; it is not controlled by events in the same manner as condi-
tions precedent or subsequent. 6 '
The court held that two elements in the Cleary fact pattern-the
longevity of service and the existence of an express employer policy
adopting certain procedures to adjudicate employee disputes-created an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.62 These factors, the
court stated, prevented the employer from discharging Cleary without
good cause. However, the court in Cleary did not clarify whether the
presence of both factors was essential to recover under this theory, or
whether the factors were simply illustrative of what might suffice. Justice
Jefferson concluded that if the plaintiff proved on remand that his termi-
nation was without good cause and that American Airlines had not exer-
cised "good faith and fair dealing" towards him, compensatory and even
punitive damages would be available.63
An examination of subsequent decisions reveals sharp differences
among the district courts of appeal regarding the application of Cleary.
Some courts have held that recovery in tort does not depend on the two
elements enunciated in Cleary, but requires a showing of unequal bar-
gaining positions. In these cases, the stronger party is held to a height-
ened duty not to act unreasonably in breaching the contract.' 4 Other
courts have interpreted the scope of the implied covenant as dependent
upon the bargain struck and the legitimate expectations of the parties to
the contract.6 5
61. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
63. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. This cause of action sounds both in contract and in
tort. A Cleary plaintiff, therefore, is not limited to a contractual measure of damages, whereas
the Pugh plaintiff may sue only in contract.
64. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984) exempli-
fies this approach. In Wallis, plaintiff was laid off after 32 years of service, ten years short of
becoming eligible for pension benefits. Two months before his layoff, he contracted with the
defendant, his employer, for monthly payments over the next ten years in exchange for agree-
ing not to compete with defendant's furniture manufacturing business. Defendant ceased mak-
ing payments after three years, claiming economic difficulties. The court held that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action not merely for breach of contract but for tortious breach. See also
Bert G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 219 Cal. Rptr. 203
(1985).
65. Thus, an employer's refusal to award performance bonuses which were within its ab-
solute discretion to confer or deny did not create a claim under Cleary. Brandt v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 201 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1984). The Brandt court
held that Lockheed had no legal duty to make invention award payments under express con-
tractual language reserving to its Invention Awards Committee the discretion to decide how
much, if any, payment would be made. Under such contract terms, there was no breach of
duty.
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A third and more expansive view was adopted by the First District
Court of Appeal when it affirmed the trial court judgment for plaintiff in
Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp.66 Plaintiff's su-
pervisor had fired her after confronting her with allegations that her ro-
mantic involvement with a competitor's employee created a conflict of
interest. Although Rulon-Miller was able to meet both of the Cleary fac-
tors,6 7 the trial judge instructed the jury instead to consider seven factors
which comprised a factual analysis far more extensive and detailed than
Cleary 's.68
The Second District Court of Appeal has taken a more limited ap-
proach and has dismissed this type of cause of action on demurrer when
the two Cleary factors are absent.6 9 In Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors,70 plaintiff had worked for the defendant for less than four years,
and alleged no facts to show that his discharge violated any employer
policy or procedures. In Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West,71 plaintiff
was employed for less than two years, and failed to allege violation of any
personnel policies.72 In Shapiro, the court suggested in dicta that a
Cleary claim could consist of allegations of "bad faith action extraneous
to the contract, combined with the obligor's intent to frustrate the obli-
66. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
67. See supra text accompanying note 62. Plaintiff, a marketing manager and an IBM
employee for more than ten years, was terminated despite a formal company policy of respect-
ing employee privacy insofar as private "behavior" did not conflict with job performance. 162
Cal. App. 3d at 249, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
68. The factors approved by the Court of Appeal were: (1) whether the employee was
discharged for legitimate business and employment reasons; (2) whether the employee was
discharged on a pretext; (3) whether the employee was engaged in a sensitive or confidential
management position; (4) whether the employee had a conflict of interest in performing the
job; (5) whether the employee's "personal, private or social relationships endangered, injured
or jeopardized the employer's legitimate business interests;" (6) whether the employer violated,
invaded, or infringed upon the employee's personal privacy and personal, private, and social
relationships; and (7) whether there was employment discrimination based on sex. 162 Cal.
App. 3d at 252 n.6, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532 n.6.
69. Even in the presence of both Cleary factors, an employer may successfully defend by
showing good faith discharge which does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1983), in which a management level employee was discharged for violating an unwritten
company rule against fraternizing with non-management employees. The employee, who had
been counseled regarding the purpose of the rule and defendant's intent to enforce it strictly,
had lied to his supervisors in response to questions concerning his relationship with a
subordinate. The Crosier court concluded that defendant United Parcel Service had in fact
exercised "good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
70. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
71. 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984).
72. Newfield also raised a statute of frauds argument. The court suggested that either an
oral contract must be terminable at will by both of the parties, or, if it is not terminable at will
(and there is therefore a reasonable expectation of employment for more than one year), the
statute of frauds will bar an action. Id. at 446, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13.
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gee's enjoyment of contract rights."73 However, the Second District
Court of Appeal dismissed both Shapiro and Newfield since neither plain-
tiff had met both the longevity and the express employer policy elements
of Cleary.
II. Assessing the Proper Scope of Cleary
A. Dissension in the Courts of Appeal
1. The Kihanna Alternative
The First District Court of Appeal recently held in Khanna v.
Microdata Corp.74 that neither of the Cleary factors is necessary to state a
claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
Khanna, plaintiff was enticed to work for Microdata Corporation as a
computer salesperson. The company promised Khanna a specific rate of
commission on an especially lucrative sales account. After starting work,
plaintiff was taken off the account and denied the agreed-upon compensa-
tion. Upon filing suit for commissions on the account, he was terminated
for disloyalty.
Despite plaintiff's mere two and a half years on the job and the
absence of any formal employer dispute resolution procedures, the court
of appeal upheld the jury award of compensatory damages. The court
explained:
We cannot agree ... that the factors relied on... in Cleary are the
sine qua non to establishing a breach of the covenant .... [T]he
theory of recovery articulated in Cleary is not dependent on the
particular factors identified in that case .... The facts in Cleary
establish only one manner among many by which an employer
might violate this covenant.75
Khanna represents one extreme of the two basic approaches taken
since Cleary. Under Khanna, the longevity and employer policy factors
have merely evidentiary significance, indicating examples of "bad faith
action extraneous to the contract" and showing the employer's intent to
frustrate the employee's contract rights.7 6 Hence, neither of the two
Cleary factors is essential for recovery.
2. The Court of Appeal's Analysis in Foley
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. ," the Second District interpreted
Cleary more narrowly. The plaintiff had worked for the defendant for
73. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
74. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
75. Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
76. Id. at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
77. 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), rev. granted, 41 Cal. 3d 35, 712 P.2d
891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986).
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seven years, and alleged that the company's employee policies included
"termination guidelines." 78 Plaintiff alleged that he was dismissed for
reporting to his superiors that the F.B.I. was investigating defendant's
new company manager for suspected embezzlement at a previous job.
The court of appeal sustained the dismissal of the Cleary cause of
action, holding that the plaintiff had not met the longevity and employer
policy requirements.79 In strident dicta, the court criticized the three
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine as unfair, since the em-
ployee is free to walk away from a job while an employer attempting to
end employment relationships at will is subject to tort and/or contract
liability.8" The court rejected Foley's Tameny claim, asserting that pro-
tecting plaintiff for "report[ing] on fellow employees"'" served no public
policy. The court then held that the Pugh claim was barred by the statute
of frauds, and rejected the Cleary claim. 2
On appeal, the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in
June 198683 on whether, inter alia, longevity of service is "a sine qua
non" for a Cleary cause of action.
84
B. The Current Prospects: Searching for a Better Mousetrap
Both the judiciary and the legislature have attempted to modify the
employment at will doctrine. This section explores the ad hoc develop-
ment of judicial exceptions and legislative attempts to fashion alterna-
tives to this doctrine.
L Judicial Options
The Foley appeal provides an opportunity for the California
Supreme Court to determine the scope of the employment at will doc-
trine. Tameny's "tortious discharge", Pugh's "breach of employment
contract", and Cleary's "bad faith discharge" theories 5 have chipped
away at a rule which is generally considered to be unacceptably harsh on
78. Id. at 244-45, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
79. Id. at 250, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
80. Id. at 248-50, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 868-71.
81. Id. at 248, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
82. Id.
83. The Court heard oral argument a second time in April, 1987, following the arrival of
its three new members-Justices Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman.
In January 1986, the California Supreme Court had also granted hearing in Santa Monica
Hosp. v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 138, 218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1985), rev. granted, 711
P.2d 520, 222 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1986). In Santa Monica Hosp., the Second District Court of
Appeal sustained the dismissal of plaintiff's Cleary cause of action on the statute of frauds
grounds enunciated in Newfield. See supra note 72.
84. Appellant's Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court at 2 (LA32148).
85. These three terms are the shorthand employed by the court in Koehrer v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986), to describe California's three com-
mon law theories.
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employees.86 The question is whether this piecemeal approach should
continue, or whether the rule itself has outlived its usefulness.
8 7
By affirming the Second District Court of Appeal's rationale in Fo-
ley, the Supreme Court would severely limit bad faith discharge actions.
Furthermore, Foley did not define the parameters of the two Cleary fac-
tors. How much "longevity" is required? If eighteen years was enough
in Cleary and yet seven years was not enough in Foley, where should the
line be drawn?88 Should the courts analyze longevity on a case by case
basis? Will an employer's formal termination policy and procedure, as
described in an "official employee manual", offset a shorter duration of
employment? Or should the second Cleary factor stand on its own? If so,
must employer liability depend on individually addressed termination
policy and procedure guidelines, as Newfield seems to imply? 9 Or
should internal memoranda addressed only to supervisory personnel and
not distributed to other employees suffice?
In the alternative, the Supreme Court could reverse Foley, perhaps
endorsing Khanna." Under the latter approach, plaintiffs will have a
smorgasbord of factors on which to base an action for bad faith breach.
However, this type of untrammelled approach poses serious problems.
Employers and employees will be unable to predict what range of con-
duct is acceptable. Unscrupulous employers may be tempted to test the
boundaries of acceptable termination procedures, and employees may be
prompted to file lawsuits almost reflexively if they are terminated. The
courts subsequently should brace themselves for a deluge of employment
litigation.
86. See, e.g., Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172 n.7, 610 P.2d 1330, 1333 n.7, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839, 842 n.7 (1980) (citing Blades, supra note 5, and Summers, supra note 16).
87. As suggested below, infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text, the prevailing hop-
scotch of judicial common law exceptions ill-serves the policy goal of fashioning fair and con-
sistent standards for terminating employment. A more effective policy would enable
employers and employees alike to improve relations, harmonize their needs, and avoid
litigation.
88. Even if a line between these two is drawn, it is questionable whether the courts can do
so in a rationally defensible manner. Line-drawing is generally considered properly to fall
within the legislative province.
89. Compare the termination procedures in Santa Monica Hosp. v. Superior Court, 192
Cal. App. 3d 138, 218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1985), rev. granted, 711 P.2d 520, 222 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1986), in which an internal investigation was followed by disciplinary action taken without
resort to any formal grievance process, with those in Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisers,
152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal Rptr. 613 (1984), in which an executive level employee had
signed a stock option agreement which expressly stated that he could be terminated at any
time, with or without cause. The Supreme Court's decision in Foley might profitably discuss
the effects of differences in personnel procedures among employees at different levels of
responsibility.
90. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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2. The Legislative Option
The California Legislature unsuccessfully attempted in its 1985-
1986 session to devise alternatives to the employment at will doctrine and
its ambiguous exceptions. Two bills would have altered both the employ-
ment at will rule and its judicially-created exceptions for those employees
who are neither in the public sector nor protected by collective bargain-
ing provisions.
Senate Bill 1348,91 as proposed by Senator Bill Greene,92 would
have repealed Labor Code section 2922 and added a new Article 3.7 to
the Code. 93 The bill provided that discharges could be made only for
"just cause", 94 and required an employer to furnish an employee with
"notice of intent to discharge" prior to termination. The employee could
then file a complaint with the Department of Industrial Relations, which
would appoint a mediator to confer with the parties. If mediation failed,
the parties could proceed to binding arbitration. The employer would
need to establish by clear and convincing evidence a just cause for dis-
charge. These protections would apply to all employees with three or
more months of service.
Assembly Bill 2800,91 as introduced by former Assemblyman Al-
ister McAlister,96 was management's response to the union-backed
Greene bill. The Assembly bill would have retained section 2922 but
changed the three common law modifications. 97 The bill allowed an em-
ployee to retain her job during mediation, as did S.B. 1348, and during
what was intended to be a speedy arbitration process, if arbitration was
necessary. Under A.B. 2800, however, the employee carried the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the discharge was
"wrongful", i.e., not for a legitimate business reason. These termination
procedures would be available only to employees with five or more years
of service.
98
91. S.B. 1348 was introduced in the California Legislature's 1985-1986 Regular Session.
It failed to win enactment. A copy of the bill is on file at the offices of the Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly.
92. D-Los Angeles.
93. S.B. 1348, supra note 91, at 2-4.
94. S.B. 1348 contained no explicit definition of this critical term, referring only to "just
cause" standards developed in labor arbitration proceedings under collective bargaining agree-
ments. See proposed CAL. LAB. CODE § 2881(a), S.B. 1348, supra note 91, at 4.
95. A.B. 2800 was introduced in the California Legislature's 1985-1986 Regular Session,
but failed to become law. A copy of the bill is on file at the offices of the Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly.
96. D-Alameda/Santa Clara
97. Proposed CAL. LAB. CODE § 2882, A.B. 2800 supra note 95, at 3-4.
98. Id.
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Both bills would have eliminated tort damages99 by limiting relief to
reinstatement, back pay and/or front pay,"° and, in certain circum-
stances, costs and attorney's fees. 01 The Legislature was unable to agree
on a compromise during the 1985-1986 session and hence, both bills
failed.
3. The Preemption Problem
The judicial and legislative restrictions on the employment at will
rule share the potential for federal preemption. Since Congress may ex-
pressly or impliedly preempt state law under authority of the Supremacy
Clause,1"2 federal legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)10 3 preempts many aspects of state law. Congress has not acted
to occupy the entire field of labor relations,"° however, and many ques-
tions of employment law are left to the states.0 5 But where Congress has
acted, courts must discern whether a local regulation "conflicts with fed-
eral law or would frustrate the federal scheme."' 6 The Tameny, Pugh,
and Cleary theories interrelate with, and in part may be preempted by,
99. Proposed CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2886-2891, S.B. 1348, supra note 91, at 5-9; proposed
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2884, A.B. 2800, supra note 95, at 4-5. Both Tameny and Cleary presently
allow tort damages. See supra notes 33-36, 63 and accompanying text.
100. S.B. 1348 would have allowed back pay for a period of two years from the date the
mediator or arbitrator determined that reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy. Pro-
posed CAL. LAB. CODE § 2890(b)(2), S.B. 1348, supra note 91, at 8. "Front pay" is defined in
A.B. 2800 as part or all of the employee's predischarge earnings for a period not to exceed one
year from the original trial. Proposed CAL. LAB. CODE § 2884(c), A.B. 2800, supra note 95, at
5.
101. S.B. 1348 authorized the arbitrator to award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing
employee, or to an employer upon a determination that the employee's appeal of the discharge
was frivolous or vexatious. Proposed CAL. LAB. CODE § 2890(c), S.B. 1348, supra note 91, at
8. A.B. 2800 allowed attorney's fees to an employee only if her offer to arbitrate was rejected
by the employer and the employee later prevailed in a wrongful discharge suit. Proposed CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2887(b), A.B. 2800, supra note 95, at 7-8.
102. U.S. CONST., art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.").
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1986). The NLRA attempts (if not always successfully) to fos-
ter the peaceful interaction of management and labor representatives through the collective
bargaining process. The Act is designed to safeguard the rights of workers to organize and
select bargaining representatives of their own choosing, as well as to refrain from such activity.
Id. § 158. Its avowed legislative goal is to allow workers to assume a more active role in setting
the terms and conditions of employment. Id. § 151.
104. In the NLRA context, for example, the states are preempted from regulating conduct
which is actually or arguably protected or prohibited under the Act. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Tameny public policy claims are particularly suscep-
tible to preemption challenges. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
105. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971).
106. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
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federal statutes governing numerous facets of employment.1 7 In Foley,
the California Supreme Court should consider possible preemption
problems in deciding whether a new approach is warranted to preserve
California's particular interests 08 in regulating employment termination
practices.
a. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
One example of an interrelating federal legislative scheme is the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), °9 which expressly
preempts all claims relating to employee benefits governed by its provi-
sions. 110 In Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,1 I plain-
tiff brought suit in a California court alleging mishandling of her
disability benefits.112 Relying on language in ERISA stating that the Act
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan,"'113 the Ninth Circuit held that
the Act preempts any cause of action under state law for improper han-
dling of claims under benefit plans. 
114
In Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., I5 plaintiff claimed
he had been wrongfully discharged116 by an employer seeking to avoid
the obligation to pay him his maximum pension benefits. The district
court held that ERISA preempted the state law cause of action, observ-
ing that section 510 of ERISA117 makes unlawful the discharge of an
107. See, eg., Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Actions,
8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1986).
108. In Garmon, the Court conceded that preemption may not be inferred "where the regu-
lated conduct touch[es] interests... deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." 359
U.S. at 244.
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1986). ERISA was enacted in 1974 as a detailed regulatory
scheme intended to ensure the fiscal soundness and equitable administration of private em-
ployee benefit plans. Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 487 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1986).
111. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
112. Plaintiff alleged breaches of her employment contract and of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Defendant removed the action to federal court, where it won
summary judgment. Id. at 484-85.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1986).
114. 722 F.2d at 487-88. The court noted that ERISA specifically requires that a fiduciary
process claims "in good faith, and in a fair and diligent manner." Id. at 488.
115. 608 F. Supp. 1315 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
116. The plaintiff in Baker alleged all three wrongful discharge theories. Id. at 1317. The
court held that the absence of employer policy or procedure regarding discharge precluded a
cause of action under Cleary regardless of preemption concerns. The court rejected the plain-
tiff's claim under Pugh because of the existence of an employment agreement signed by the
plaintiff upon his most recent promotion. The agreement stated that employment would con-
tinue for the "length of time as shall be mutually agreeable." The district court treated this
document as evidence of an express employment at will arrangement. Id. at 1320-21.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1986).
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employee "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right
to which such participant may become entitled" under a pension plan." 8
Thus, a wrongfully discharged employee who seeks recovery related to
her ERISA-regulated benefits may not pursue such claims under Califor-
nia's common law exceptions to the at will rule.
b. Public Policy (Tameny) Claims
Courts have also rejected some Tameny claims as conflicting with
federal law.119 If federal legislation provides the exclusive means of fur-
thering a specific public policy, state courts may not authorize additional
relief. 120
Plaintiffs most likely to encounter preemption defenses are those
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, since collective bargaining
is heavily regulated by federal law. In Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated
Copper Co.,121 plaintiff allegedly was discharged for complaining about
unsafe mining conditions and for engaging in concerted labor activity.
The district court held that the NLRA and the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act 122 preempted plaintiff's claims. Although the plaintiff had
filed prior grievances, he did not submit a claim for arbitration as re-
quired under the collective bargaining agreement. The Ninth Circuit held
that Olguin could not seek protection under state law because he had not
acted on behalf of any state law or policy. 123 Tameny relief thus appears
to be unavailable to plaintiffs from a unionized workforce when the al-
leged reasons for their discharge fall within the grievance and arbitration
provisions of their collective bargaining agreements.
c. Implied-in-Fact Covenant Claims
As with a public policy claim, plaintiffs covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement are apt to run afoul of the preemption doctrine in
trying to assert a state law claim under the implied-in-fact covenant. The
courts have held consistently that the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement bars suits based on common law claims of an implied-in-fact
118. 607 F. Supp. at 1318.
119. See, e.g., supra note 38.
120. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (preemption in the NLRA context);
supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text (preemption in the ERISA context).
121. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
122. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1986).
123. 740 F.2d at 1475. The court distinguished Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985), by explaining that California's
interest in enforcing local health regulations justified the availability of a private tort action as
a means of enforcement and did not interfere with federal labor policy. 740 F.2d at 1475. See
supra note 38.
covenant.' 2 4 In Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,2 ' the court held
that the NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 126 preempted plaintiff's wrongful discharge claims under
Tameny and Pugh. The court stated that the NLRA's exclusive protec-
tion of an employee's "concerted labor activities" ' 7 encompassed plain-
tiff's allegations that he was discharged for passing out petitions and
voicing employee complaints. Since plaintiff's claims constituted an al-
leged breach of his collective bargaining agreement, they fell within the
preemptive scope of the LMRA.
Collective bargaining agreements generally contain provisions per-
mitting discharge only for "just cause."' 28 As the creation and adminis-
tration of collective bargaining agreements is extensively regulated by the
NLRA, federal law provides the proper tools for interpreting and enforc-
ing the terms of such agreements, and thus preempts any conflicting state
law under which a claimant seeks to vary the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Only if the state confers rights which arise independ-
ent of the collective bargaining instrument or other formal contract
terms will a common law cause of action withstand a preemption attack
at the pleadings stage. 1
29
d. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
A Cleary cause of action is also subject to attack on preemption
grounds when a collective bargaining agreement or relevant statute con-
trols. In an effort to avoid the LMRA's preemptive effect, the plaintiff in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck 0 framed his allegation of bad faith han-
dling of his insurance claims by his employer as a tortious breach of Wis-
consin's common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that the LMRA's requirement of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies applied only to violations of labor contracts.' 3 '
The court concluded that Lueck's bad faith tort claim was independent
124. The remedy in such instances lies in a federal court action under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1986)), based on the alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
See infra note 134; see also Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1985);
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
126. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1986). The LMRA was enacted in part to empower the federal
courts "to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of
labor contracts." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 221 (1985).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1986).
128. "[A]pproximately 80 percent of ... [collective bargaining] agreements specifically
require just cause for discharge." Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320-21
n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 n.5 (1981).
129. See Harper, 764 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1985).
130. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
131. Id. at 215.
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of the contract (despite its dependence on the contractual relationship)
and hence, was not preempted by the LMRA. 132
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained
that federal law must determine the interpretation of terms in collective
bargaining agreements. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would
weaken the reliability of these agreements by subjecting them to the pos-
sibility of different interpretations by state and federal courts.
133
Moreover:
questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches
of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal
law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach
of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result
would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the
requirements of Section 301 [of the LMRA] by re-labeling their
contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.'
34
The Court also observed that although the LMRA does not control
private labor contracts negotiated outside the collective bargaining con-
text, neither could state tort law define the meaning of a contractual rela-
tionship that fell within the LMRA. Because Wisconsin tort theory was
based on a duty of good faith and fair dealing derived "from the rights
and obligations established by the contract,"' 135 the Court held that the
LMRA must preempt state law.
136
4. The Need For A Different Approach
Although federal or state137 statutory schemes do not preempt all
wrongful discharge claims, the inconsistency of current approaches
leaves different groups of employees with markedly dissimilar legal pro-
tections. Roughly twenty-eight percent of the workforce 138 is covered by
132. Id. at 216-17.
133. Id. at 209-10.
134. Id. at 211. Section 301 of the Act provides that suits for violations of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization may be brought in federal court. 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1986). This statute does not simply vest jurisdiction in the general sense; it autho-
rizes the judicial development of federal labor law concepts for the resolution of such disputes.
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
135. 471 U.S. at 217.
136. The Court stated as an additional basis for its holding the need to ensure that griev-
ance and arbitration procedures would not be circumvented by a plaintiff's headlong rush to
state court. Id. at 219 ("[O]nly that result [preemption] preserves the central role of arbitration
in our 'system of industrial self-government.' ").
137. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-
12926 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988), may also preempt certain wrongful discharge claims. See
Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1983); see also infra
notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
138. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979).
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collective bargaining agreements that offer the employees grievance and
arbitration procedures. Arguably, these procedures compensate for the
loss of state tort remedies, including punitive damages. 139 Public sector
employees may also enjoy the benefits of union representation. 140 Even if
they do not, civil service provisions premised on the notion that employ-
ees may be discharged only for cause provide for notice and hearing and
various appeal procedures.' 41
Non-unionized employees in the private sector have the most to lose
under current California law. As discussed earlier, ERISA may protect
some claims based on interference with pension and related benefits.142
Most of the wrongful discharge claims for this group of workers, how-
ever, turn on the "California Trilogy"' 4 3 of exceptions to the employ-
ment at will rule for protection from arbitrary action by employers.
By considering bills which attempt to provide remedies for wrongful
discharge, the California Legislature has already indicated its interest in
closing the gap for unprotected workers. But the preemption doctrine
makes clear that this may not be enough. If Congress decides to legislate
further in this area, unprotected California workers may rely only on
such remedies as are provided by federal largesse. Foley presents an im-
portant opportunity to invoke state constitutional principles to anchor
more securely California's interests in protecting employees from wrong-
ful discharge.
139. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing subjects private employers to
both compensatory and punitive damages. McAllister v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 183 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657, 228 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353 (1986). Tameny, Cleary, and Pugh
all sought punitive damages from their employers. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167, 169, 610 P.2d 721, 721, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 839 (1980); Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., II1 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 315, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 918 (1981).
140. See, eg., State Employer-Employee Relations Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3512-3524
(West 1980 & Supp. 1988); SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 16, art. XI.A (Employee Rela-
tions Ordinance) and accompanying SAN FRANCISCO CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N RULES (1984).
141. See, e.g., California Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). The Procedural Bill of Rights Act affords
certain due process protections to all peace officers, such as the right to an administrative
appeal when any disciplinary action is taken. The Act has been described as "a catalogue of
the minimum rights the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee rela-
tions." Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 135, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 235 (1982) (citations
omitted).
142. See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
143. Miller & Estes, supra note 34, at 104.
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III. Changing the Perspective: Constitutional Solutions to the
Wrongful Discharge Dilemma
A. Federal Equal Protection Requirements
At the turn of the century, legislative and judicial lawmaking made
clear that the public interest in stable employment relations was sub-
servient to the policy supporting absolute freedom of contract. 1" Since
the New Deal, an explosion of employment legislation supportive of em-
ployees' rights to be free of unfair termination practices indicates that
both federal and state governments consider the employment relation-
ship145 deserving of sustained intervention.
Numerous federal and state statutes have been enacted since the
1920s to regulate employment matters. The first major statutory scheme,
enacted in 1935, was the National Labor Relations Act.146 Both the
NLRA and the Railway Labor Act of 1926147 imposed limited restric-
tions on the freedom to terminate unionized employees in various indus-
tries affecting national commerce. 148 On a smaller scale, the Selective
Service Act of 1940149 anticipated the postwar influx of returning work-
ers in providing a one year term of reemployment for all returning veter-
ans, making it unlawful to discharge them without cause from the
civilian jobs they had held prior to their World War II service.1 50 Simi-
larly, the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968151 prohibited dis-
144. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1907); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915);
Blades, supra note 5, at 1416-19.
145. As expressed by one commentator:
The employment relationship is subject to intensive regulation by both the fed-
eral and state governments. Of particular significance is the fact that governmental
regulation has become focused on what constitutes justification for termination of
employment, with the consequence that employers may no longer discharge employ-
ees for reasons that were legally unquestionable a few years ago. As the list of forbid-
den causes lengthens, the implication is strengthened that there is governmental
approval of the remaining causes.
Peck, supra note 138, at 21.
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1986).
147. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1986).
148. For example, § 8(a)(4) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1986). The basic prohibition of
§ 8(a)(3) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate "in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or [in] any term or condition of employment, to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. § 158(a)(3). The Railway Labor Act's
purposes include "to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or
any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor
organization." 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1986).
149. Ch. 720, § 8(c), 54 Stat. 885. This statute has been reenacted as the Veterans Re-
employment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1986).
150. 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1986).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1986).
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charge of an employee after a single instance of garnishment for
indebtedness.i"2
More broadly, the "Equal Employment Opportunities" provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964153 protect all public and
private employees from discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment 154 on the basis of race, religion, color, creed, or sex. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975155 similarly protects
workers between forty and seventy years of age. California's Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA)15 6 parallels Title VII in many re-
spects, but enlarges the range of prohibited conduct.1
57
Insofar as this plethora of legislative restrictions significantly limits
an employer's freedom to terminate at will, at least one commentator has
argued that these laws constitute a pattern of intensive state "regulation"
of the factors that may justify an employee's discharge. 5 ' When there is
a sufficient nexus' 59 between the state regulation and the challenged con-
duct, there is sufficient "state action" to trigger a traditional equal pro-
tection analysis.' 60
Developments in California since 1980 strongly support this hypoth-
esis. The creation of three judicially-devised exceptions to the employ-
ment at will rule16 1 and recent legislative efforts to modify that rule'6 2
indicate this state's continuing efforts to regulate the balance of power in
the employment relationship. The nexus between state regulation and
employment termination practices is very close. California employers
must conform to the federal and state statutes discussed above in addi-
tion to the three judicial modifications to the employment at will rule.
The resulting intrusion into employer termination decisions by state and
federal regulatory schemes makes termination decisions a product of
state action. This nexus, in turn, leads to the question of whether the
regulatory scheme is even-handed in its treatment of all employees-that
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1986).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1986).
154. This protection extends to discrimination in hiring, promotions, salary setting, and
discharge. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1986).
156. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
157. In addition to the five categories in Title VII, the FEHA forbids discrimination on the
basis of ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, or marital status. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
158. Peck, supra note 138, at 21.
159. "Nexus" has been defined as the legal interrelation between two events; a link which is
"direct and substantial in nature" and "clearly and logically" ties the two together. 181 Inc. v.
Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 357, 336 A.2d 501, 505 (1975). For a classic
exposition of the nexus requirement in the state action context for federal equal protection
purposes, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
160. Peck, supra note 138, at 21-23.
161. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
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is, whether it satisfies the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. 1
63
Once the state action requirement is satisfied, courts must determine
the appropriate standard of review. Prior to the New Deal, courts
viewed restrictions on employment as simple matters of economic regula-
tion, and thus utilized the rational basis test.164 It has been argued co-
gently that even under such a deferential standard "there is no rational
basis for denying job protection to some employees while granting it to
others."'165 However, this Note next explains why California should em-
ploy the more rigorous strict scrutiny test for review of wrongful dis-
charge claims, regardless of whether the employer is a public or private
entity or whether the employee is a union member.1 66
B. California's Equal Protection Clause: A Significant Difference
The Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution 67 fur-
nishes a more compelling argument for constitutional protection of an
employee's interest in continued employment than does its federal coun-
terpart. Unlike the federal provision, the California Constitution does
not expressly impose a state action requirement. The California Supreme
Court has explained the importance of this distinction as follows:
[The] state equal protection provisions, while "substantially
the equivalent of" the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, are possessed of an
independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analy-
sis different from that which would obtain if only the federal stan-
dard were applicable. . . . "[I]n the area of fundamental civil
liberties.., our first referen[ce] is [to] California law.... Accord-
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in part, that no state shall "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
164. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating as an abridgment of
freedom of contract a New York statute setting a ceiling of sixty hours per workweek for
bakers).
165. Peck, supra note 138, at 42.
166. If nonunionized private sector employees constitute a "suspect classification", then
use of the strict scrutiny test is clearly appropriate. While these employees have not as yet
been regarded as "suspect", a court could find that a pattern of state action which has consist-
ently excluded this group from the protections afforded other employees constitutes purposeful
discrimination. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at large voting system as
evidence of purposeful exclusion of blacks from county government offices). Strict scrutiny
may be triggered even though this distinction was not the primary motive for extending job
protections to unionized and/or government employees. See Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning classification as pretext to exclude low income,
integrated housing).
Alternatively, the strict scrutiny standard may be invoked by identifying continued em-
ployment as a fundamental right under an equal protection analysis. See infra notes 176-183
and accompanying text.
167. CAL. CONsT. art I, § 7. See supra note 2.
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ingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fun-
damental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful
consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only
when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed
by California law."
168
The California Supreme Court has held that "state action" is not
necessary to trigger the safeguards of California's Equal Protection
Clause in the employment context. In Gay Law Students Association v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 169 plaintiffs proved an equal protec-
tion violation by showing that a public utility had excluded homosexuals
from any positions of employment. The California Supreme Court noted
that although the federal due process and equal protection clauses curtail
only "state" activities, section 7(a) of article I of the California Constitu-
tion contains no such express restriction.170 The court first opined that a
public utility had "special obligations ... to refrain from all forms of
arbitrary employment discrimination.""17 These obligations, the court
reasoned, were significant despite the fact that sexual preference is not a
statutorily enumerated category of discrimination under the FEHA.172
Going beyond the context of public utilities, the court stated:
Protection against the arbitrary foreclosing of employment oppor-
tunities lies close to the heart of the protection against "second-
class citizenship" which the equal protection clause was intended
to guarantee. . . . "[D]iscrimination in employment is one of the
most deplorable forms of discrimination known to our society, for
it deals not just with an individual's sharing in the 'outer benefits'
of being an American citizen, but rather the ability to provide de-
cently for oneself and one's family in a job or profession for which
he qualifies and chooses."
173
The Supreme Court in Foley should take the equal protection ration-
ale created by Gay Law Students to its logical conclusion. While the
"special obligation" language of Gay Law Students may appear to limit
the scope of that decision, the language of section 7(a) does not limit
equal protection to persons employed by, or seeking employment with,
168. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d. 929, 950,135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366
(1976) (quoting in part People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d. 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d. 753, 758 n.4,
123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975)) (emphasis added). Accord Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App.
3d 370, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1984) (construing federal and state free speech clauses); see also
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979);
Peck, supra note 138, at 23 ("[S]tate supreme courts are under no compulsion to adopt the
U.S. Supreme Court standards... for the purpose of determining what constitutes state action
within the meaning of the due process clauses of state constitutions.").
169. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
170. Id. at 466-68, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
171. Id. at 466, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
172. See supra note 156.
173. 24 Cal. 3d at 470, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (quoting in part Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 421 F.2d. 888, 898 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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employers with special obligations. The basic policy enunciated in Gay
Law Students was the denunciation of employment discrimination as a
particularly "deplorable" form of arbitrary conduct. As long as the law
leaves one class of employees vulnerable to termination without just
cause while others are protected by just cause standards, California, in
effect, continues to endorse arbitrary treatment of some persons while
condemning it as to others, even though both classes of employees are
similarly situated.
The California Supreme Court thus should utilize section 7(a) to
end the continued exclusion of non-unionized, private sector employees
from the protections against the employment at will rule which are pres-
ently afforded to other groups of employees. There is no greater need for
protection from wrongful discharge decisions in government employ-
ment than there is in private employment. Nor does this exclusion serve
any legitimate state purpose; it certainly serves no compelling state inter-
est.174 The court's application of the California Equal Protection Clause
in Gay Law Students makes clear that the more restrictive federal stan-
dard, with its "state action" requirement, need not control when vulnera-
ble individuals' rights to equal protection are implicated. 175
A fundamental rights analysis also supports this conclusion. 176 Cal-
174. The California Supreme Court has recently voiced its disapproval of dissimilar treat-
ment of public and private sector employees in other employment matters. In County Sanita-
tion Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 214 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1985), the court concluded that a blanket prohibition against strikes by public employees was
no longer appropriate. The court traced the development of the right to strike from the era
when it was punishable as a conspiracy to its present status as a protected activity under the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). 38 Cal. 3d at 569, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426-
27. Although the California legislature had enacted statutes based on the NLRA model to
permit state and local employees to engage in collective bargaining, it had remained silent on
the question of strikes. The court held that absent valid statutory prohibitions, public em-
ployee strikes would not be unlawful unless it was clearly demonstrated that a strike created "a
substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the public." Id. at 586, 214 Cal.
Rptr. at 439.
Similarly, the court held one year later that statutory classifications which forbade the
involuntary administration of polygraphs to any private employee and to state "public safety
officers" constituted a denial of equal protection to public employees not exempted by the
statute. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1986). Noting the existance of California's constitutionally based right of privacy,
the court explained: "legal distinctions between public and private sector employees that oper-
ate to abridge basic rights cannot withstand judicial scrutiny unless justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Id. at 951, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99. The same result should follow in the
arena of employment termination decisions.
175. See Steffes v. California Interscholastic Fed'n, 176 Cal. App. 3d 739, 222 Cal. Rptr.
355 (1986) (education); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (right
to engage in common occupations of the community).
176. Federal fundamental rights are those "personal rights that can be deemed... 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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ifornia courts may determine that a given right is fundamental and pro-
tected under the California Constitution despite determinations by the
United States Supreme Court that the same right is not "fundamental"
under the United States Constitution.177 For example, in Serrano v.
Priest,178 the California Supreme Court declared education a fundamen-
tal right. Using the strict scrutiny test, the court held that the state had
not met its burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest that
would justify discrimination in public educational opportunities on the
basis of school district wealth. 179 The California Supreme Court respect-
fully but emphatically distinguished San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez, 80 in which the United States Supreme Court held that a similar
school financing system in Texas did not violate the federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
1 81
The United States Supreme Court's refusal to designate rights to
continued employment as "fundamental" ' 2 does not prevent the Califor-
nia Supreme Court from deciding otherwise under the more generous
provisions of the California Constitution. In addition, another section of
the California Constitution suggests that the right to employment is an
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed," '183 and therefore fundamental,
right.
C. Employment Protections in the California Constitution
Article I, section 8 of the California Constitution provides: "A per-
son may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profes-
sion, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or
national or ethnic origin."18 Article I, section 8 originally prohibited
only discrimination based on sex. It was amended in the November 5,
1974 General Election to prohibit the other enumerated forms of dis-
177. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 expressly provides for this independent state authority:
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."
178. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
179. Id. at 776, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
180. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
181. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court explained that the right to education
was not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the terms of the United States Constitution. Id.
at 33-34. The Court determined that education was not a fundamental interest entitled to
strict scrutiny, and that the Texas system rationally advanced that state's legitimate objective
of furthering local control of education. Id. at 36-39.
182. See, eg., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). These cases focused on the procedural
due process requirements for divesting civil service or tenured employees of whatever rights to
employment had arisen under the relevant substantive laws of the jurisdiction. This is a far cry
from designating the right to continued employment per se as fundamental.
183. Constitutional rights need not be literally enumerated to be deserving of protection.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33.
184. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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crimination. 85 In the same election, voters first added the provisions of
article I, section 7 to the California Constitution.1 16 The ballot argu-
ments for these two amendments reveal that they were proposed to
strengthen California's "Declaration of Rights" in article 1.187 The
amendment to section 8 appears to have been in part inspired by the fate
of former article I, section 26.188 The United States Supreme Court held
the latter provision unconstitutional as an attempt to indulge private
property owners who wished to restrict property transfers on the basis of
racial or other prejudices."8 9
The language of sections 7(a) and 8 of article I clearly goes beyond
the federal constitutional language. Indeed, section 8 explicitly identifies
employment discrimination as a prohibited practice. The California
Supreme Court should make use of these constitutional provisions in de-
ciding Foley, and hold that freedom from employment discrimination is
explicitly guaranteed by the California Constitution. The importance of
this freedom to society as a whole has been demonstrated in cases hold-
ing that section 8 confers standing to sue even on plaintiffs not directly
discriminated against.190 The court should read section 8 with section
7(a) to mandate an end to arbitrariness of any kind in employment termi-
nation decisions. The fact that use of the federal Constitution would
bring a different result need not prevent California from fashioning its
own constitutional standard for ensuring fair employment termination
procedures for its residents.
185. See California Voters' Pamphlet for the November 5, 1974 General Election 72 [here-
inafter Voters Pamphlet] (copy on file at the offices of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quar-
terly). The use of election ballot arguments as an aid in construing state constitutional
amendments was noted with approval in Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long
Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 943 n.5, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 93 n.5 (1986) (initiative amendments).
186. Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 185, at 27. CAL. CONST. art I, § 7 provides:
(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law or denied equal protection of the laws.
(b) A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not
granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the
Legislature may be altered or revoked.
Sections 7 and 8 were contained collectively in Proposition 7.
187. Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 185, at 28. California's "Declaration of Rights" in-
cludes free speech, petition, and assembly clauses similar to the federal model. CAL. CONST.
art. I, §§ 2-3. It also contains provisions not found in the federal Bill of Rights, most notably
the right to privacy. Id. art I, § 1.
188. Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 185, at 72. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26, enacted through
initiative petition, provided:
Neither the state nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to
sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to declare to sell, lease or rent
such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses
189. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26); see
also Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 185, at 28-29.
190. Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80, 83 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
D. The Foley Solution
Foley presents the California Supreme Court with the opportunity to
bring consistency to the hodgepodge of wrongful discharge analyses
which have developed in response to the inherent unfairness of the em-
ployment at will rule. The court in Gay Law Students took an important
first step in construing article I, section 7(a) to prohibit arbitrary deci-
sionmaking by certain employers.19 In Serrano, the court pointed out
that California may define a fundamental interest even where the United
States Supreme Court would find none. 92 By additionally relying on
article I, section 8 to demonstrate the "fundamental" importance of em-
ployment rights, the court in Foley justifiably can utilize a strict scrutiny
test to determine whether any employee's discharge violates equal
protection. 193
Although Tameny, Pugh, and Cleary have been useful in limiting
the employment at will rule, they have inherent limitations. The court in
Pugh has already pointed out the propriety of judicial modification and
reinterpretation of Labor Code section 2922, which is merely the codifi-
cation of a historically inaccurate common law rule.1 94 Moreover, con-
tinuation of this series of judicial modifications risks the danger of
increasing conflicts with existing federal labor legislation. Only by basing
its analysis on state constitutional grounds can the court safely fashion a
workable, evenhanded standard that avoids the perils of preemption on
the one hand and incipient equal protection problems on the other. The
court can readily adapt standards to be applied under such a constitu-
tionally-based approach from the existing body of decisions in, for exam-
ple, the grievance and arbitration setting of collective bargaining.1 95
Further, the creation of a constitutionally-based standard will better
serve the interests of the employer, the employee, and the public. Em-
ployer interests in directing and controlling the workforce need not be
sacrificed under this standard. Employers would retain the right to dis-
charge employees where sound, nondiscriminatory business reasons ex-
ist. Employees could expect uniform treatment without regard, for
191. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text.
193. The rational basis test does not afford the desired level of protection. The California
Legislature, under pressure from employers, conceivably could enact laws to satisfy the mini-
mal requirement of showing some "reasonable" governmental objective in granting inade-
quate, piecemeal job protections. Since the California Supreme Court has already defined
certain employment opportunities as a fundamental right, see supra note 175 and accompany-
ing text, use of the strict scrutiny test is appropriate.
194. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
920-21 (1981), see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
195. This was the approach envisioned under S.B. 1348 and A.B. 2800. See supra notes 93-
101 and accompanying text.
THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
Winter 1988]
Winter 1988]
388 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 15:359
example, to union affliation.196 Employer and employee interests would
be served by use of predictable and reliable codes of disciplinary conduct;
more harmonious and even more productive working conditions would
likely follow.197 The public's interest in encouraging more peaceful in-
dustrial relations has been cited as a factor in the enactment of such va-
ried legislative packages as the NLRA 198 and the California Public
Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights.1 99 A uniform, constitution-
ally-premised standard of equal treatment in all employment termination
decisions would represent a responsible, innovative, and timely institu-
tional commitment to fairness in an area of fundamental human concern.
Conclusion
The California judiciary has made real progress towards limiting the
employment at will doctrine, an outmoded rule developed in an era when
workers' skills were less specialized and more easily transferable, and
when the loss of a job did not necessarily portend the economic and psy-
chological disaster that it often does today.2" The Tameny, Pugh, and
Cleary "trilogy" of exceptions to this rule, based on public policy, the
implied-in-fact covenant, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, are significant restraints on the bad faith or arbitrary exercise of
an employer's powers. These exceptions, however, do not go far enough.
The California Legislature has also begun to fashion stronger limits
on abusive discharge practices.2"1 But a plethora of federal labor statutes
raises the continuing threat of federal preemption of the state's complete
freedom to legislate in this area.202
The optimal solution is for California to rely upon the distinctive
and precisely pertinent provisions of its own Constitution. Under those
provisions, the right to continue in one's employment is properly charac-
terized as a fundamental right. In deciding Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., the California Supreme Court should rely on sections 7(a) and 8 of
the California Constitution. These provisions should be utilized to trig-
ger strict scrutiny of employment terminations when good cause for dis-
196. See Peck, supra note 138, at 14-15 ("[S]tatutes protecting employees from discharge
for union activities obviously require review of an employer's decision to discharge ... for the
purpose of determining whether that decision was motivated by consideration of the em-
ployee's union activities . . ").
197. Summers, supra note 16, at 507-08. Professor Summers observes that in western Eu-
rope similar job protections serve this goal of improving the work environment.
198. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
199. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
200. Blades, supra note 5, at 1404. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 102-136 and accompanying text.
THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
charge is not present. Good cause standards are readily available.20 3
Uniform application of these standards would promote the interests of
employers and the public, and would provide important protections to
employees threatened by bad faith or arbitrary discharge. Foley provides
the opportunity to further these fundamental constitutional values.
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203. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330 n.26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928
n.26 (198 1) ("labor arbitrators have generated a large body of decisions interpreting and apply-
ing such terms as 'just cause.' "). See also Summers, supra note 16, at 500-01 ("arbitrators
have achieved substantial consensus about underlying [just cause] principles and many detailed
rules").
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